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RECENT CASES
Administrative LawUSE OF CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION IN DENIAL
OF CLEARANCE UNDER PORT SECURITY
PROGRAM UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Petitioners, merchant seamen, were denied security clearance documents required by Coast Guard regulations' as a prerequisite for employment on American merchant vessels. The regulations provide that no such
documents shall be issued except upon approval of the Commandant of the
Coast Guard 2 An applicant who is denied the required doduments is informed of the denial in a form letter setting forth the reasons therefor generally in the formal language of the regulations. The applicant is allowed
two "appeals" from the denial, first to a local and then to a national appeal
board. The procedure before each of these boards is substantially the same.
The applicant may submit written briefs showing why he should be granted
clearance, and he may appear before the board where he may be questioned.
The board then submits a recommendation to the Commandant, who in all
cases makes the final determination.
When the applicant appears before the board, the board may, and in
petitioners' cases did, utilize secret reports furnished by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and other investigatory agencies as a basis for questioning
and determination. The contents of these reports were not revealed to the
petitioners who subsequently brought suit to enjoin the enforcement of
these regulations.3 The district court granted a "limited" injunction against
enforcement unless the petitioners were informed of the basis of the denial
of their clearance with such specificity as to give them reasonable notice
1. 33 C.F.R. c. I, subchapters (A) and (K) (Supp. 1955), formulated pursuant
to the Magnuson Act of 1950, 64 STAT. 427, 428, 50 U.S.C. §§ 191, 192, 194 (1953),
and Exec. Order No. 10173, 15 FxD. R.M. 7005-08 (1950), as amended, Exec. Order
No. 10277, 16 FxW. IZXo. 7537 (1951), and Exec. Order No. 10352, 17 Fxn. Rwo. 4607
(1952).
2. 33 C.F.R. § 121.13(d) (Supp. 1955): "Basis for rejection. The Commandant
will deny a security clearance to any person, unless upon full consideration, he is satisfied that the applicant's character and habits of life are such as to authorize the belief
that the presence of the person aboard vessels of the United States would not be inimical to the security of the United States; and in making the above determination the
Commandant may consider whether on all the evidence and information available, reasonable grounds exist for the belief that the individual: (1) Has committed any acts
of treason or sedition . . . (2) Is employed by, or subject to the influence of a foreign
government . . . (3) Has actively advocated or supported the overthrow of the government of the United States by the use of force or violence; or, (4) Has intentionally disclosed military information . . . or, (5) Is or recently has been a member of,
or affiliated, or sympathetically associated with, any . . . organization on the Attorney
General's subversive list."
3. Suit was brought as a class action under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (3). The six
individual petitioners had gone through various stages of the procedure. Confidential
reports had been used in each of their cases with varying amounts of information being revealed. Instant case at 712.
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and opportunity to marshal evidence in their defense. 4 This order was
qualified, however, in an important respect: the contents of the reports need
not be revealed to petitioners where to do so would disclose the source of
the information. The petitioners appealed from the district court's order
and the court of appeals reversed, holding that, even as amended, in conformity with the lower court order, the regulations as enforced violated due
process; petitioners must be accorded the opportunity to be confronted with
the evidence against them, and the lower court order left it entirely within
the Coast Guard's uncontrolled and unreviewable discretion to withhold
any evidence it felt would reveal the source of the information. Parkerv.
a
Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955).4

The requirement in judicial proceedings that a verdict and judgment
must be supported by sufficient evidence to satisfy the plaintiff's burden of
proof and cannot rest upon speculative inferences, 5 the hearsay rule, 6 and
the rights of confrontation and cross-examination 7 combine to prevent judicial determinations based upon "confidential" information. In federal criminal proceedings the latter two practices are constitutionally guaranteed. 8
While much evidence which would be inadmissible in a court of law may
be used as the basis of an administrative tribunal's determination,9 even
here it is said that, in "adjudicative" or quasi-judicial determinations, 10 due
process demands a fair and open hearing, with not only the right to present
evidence, but to be informed with reasonable specificity of the case on the
other side."' Recently, however, "adjudicative" determinations have been
made in a number of areas on the basis of "confidential" information, which
was not disclosed to the affected party, although he may have been given a
"hearing" at which to discuss the general charges against him.'2 The justification usually asserted for this procedure is that full revelation of the
information would be inimical to the national interest and security. 13 Judi4. Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433 (N.D. Cal. 1953).
4a. The Government has announced that it will not appeal the decision in the
instant case. N.Y. Times, March 25, 1956, § 1, p. 1, cols. 6 & 7.
5. Woods v. New York Central R.R., 222 F.2d 551 (6th Cir. 1955) ; Atlantic
Coast Line R.R. v. Anderson, 221 F.2d 548 (5th Cir. 1955); Franklin v. Skelly Oil
Co., 141 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1944) ; Louisville & N.R.R. v. Holland, 70 So. 2d 691
(Fla. 1955); Darby v. Schoolcraft, 125 N.E.2d 812 (Ind. 1955) ; Eckley v. Seese, 382
Pa. 425, 115 A2d 227 (1955).
6. See, e.g., Fotie v. United States, 137 F.2d 831, 839 (8th Cir. 1943); McCoRMIcK, EVIDENCE § 223 (1954) ; cf. UNIFORM RULtS OF EVIDENcE rule 63.
7. See, e.g., Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687 (1931); McCoRMIcK, op. cit.
supra note 6, § 19.
8. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
9. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); Ellers v.
Railroad Retirement Board, 132 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1943).
10. Agencies engaged in "rule-making" or quasi-legislative determinations are gen-

erally accorded a rather wide discretion in gathering the information used as a basis

thereof. See Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States, 288 U.S. 294 (1933) ;
Note, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 63
YALm L.J. 206, 223-25 (1953).

11. Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 14-19 (1937); ICC v. Louisville & N.
R.R., 227 U.S. 88 (1913) ; Note, An Informer's Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Aduinistrative Proceedings,supra note 10.
12. See cases cited in notes 15-18 infra.
13. See note 25 infra and accompanying text.
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cial approval of this procedure has been granted largely on the ground that
the normal due process requirements are not applicable where a "privilege"
rather than a "right" is being adjudicated. 14 The "privilege" concept has
been applied to sanction the use of confidential data, without informing the
party involved with any reasonable specificity, in such fields as public employment,15 alien exclusion, 16 application for suspension of deportation orders 1 7 and passport denials. 18 Although many writers have criticized this
"privilege-right" distinction as arbitrary and illogical, 9 it has been widely
accepted by the courts. 20 Judicial waivering from the dichotomy, however,
14. See cases cited in notes 15-18 infra; Note, An Informners Tale: Its Use in
Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953). The "privilege"
argument culminates in the conclusion that there is no constitutional requirement of a
"fair hearing" in such cases.
If Congress authorizes a hearing without spelling out the procedural requirements,

the courts may so interpret the statute as to require a "fair hearing," although constitutionally no hearing at all might be required. E.g., the Selective Service Appeal Board,
which is required by statute to hold a hearing when an appeal is taken to it, has at
times attempted to rely upon confidential information. The Court has here held that
FBI reports need not be revealed, but interpreted the statute as requiring a "fair
risumw" to be given the appellant. United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1 (1953). The
Court found it significant that the Board itself had not seen the FBI report. Id. at 6
n.10. The Court has reversed the Board where a fair resume has not been given, Simmons v. United States, 348 U.S. 397 (1955), and where the Department of Justice's
advisory report was likewise withheld. Gonzoles v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955).
15. Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided
Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) ; cf. Angilly v. United States, 199 F.2d 642 (2d Cir. 1952) ;
Deviny v. Campbell, 194 F.2d 876 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 826 (1952). But
see Money v. Anderson, 208 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1953); Kutcher v. Gray, 199 F.2d 783
(D.C. Cir. 1952).
16. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); cf. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345
U.S. 206 (1953).
17. Where the alien is a resident, he must have a fair deportation hearing, since
he is protected by due process. Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953).
This would probably bar the use of confidential information. Matranga v. Mackey, 210
F.2d 160, 161 (2d Cir. 1954) (dictum) ; see also Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48
(1955). After a deportation order is entered, application may be made to the Attorney
General for its suspension. This apparently is a "privilege," and the use of confidential
information has been permitted here. Matranga v. Mackey, supra, and cases cited therein; Jay v. Boyd, 222 F.2d 820 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 24 U.S.L. Wzxic 3181
(U.S. Jan. 10, 1956) (No. 503).
18. The obtaining of a passport has never specifically been deemed a "privilege,"
but the same effect has been obtained on the ground that it is a "foreign affairs" function, exclusively within the discretion of the executive. See Note, Passport Refusals
for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judicial Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171
(1952).
Recent cases have made serious inroads upoft this concept, however. See
Shachtman v. Dulles, 225 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Dulles v. Nathan, 225 F.2d 29
(D.C. Cir. 1955); Bauer v. Acheson, 106 F. Supp. 445 (D.D.C. 1952), 102 U. PA. L.
R.Ev. 539 (1954). In Boudin v. Dulles, 136 F. Supp. 218 (D.D.C. 1955), it was held thata
passport could not be denied, without violating due process, where that decision had
been made on the basis of confidential information. More recent authority to the contrary, however, indicates that the field is still unsettled. See the case of Weldon B.
Dayton (D.D.C.), N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1956, p. 1, col. 2, which held that a passport
denial based on confidential information was a "reasonable exercise of discretion."
19. See, e.g., Brown & Fasset, Security Tests for Maritime Workers: Due Process
Under the Port Security Program, 62 YALE L.J. 1163 (1953); Emerson & Helfeld,
Loyalty Anwng Government Employees, 58 YALE L.J. 1 (1948) ; Note, An Informer's
Tale: Its Use in Judicial and Administrative Proceedings, 63 YALE L.J. 206 (1953) ;
Comment, Passport Refusals for Political Reasons: Constitutional Issues and Judicial
Review, 61 YALE L.J. 171 (1952) ; 102 U. PA. L. REv. 539 (1954) ; 6 RuTGEaS L. REv.
461 (1952).
20. See notes 15-19 supra. The significance of this acceptance is, of course, in the
vast number of people affected by a single decision.
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seems currently to be increasing. While the Supreme Court has been reluctant to meet the issue squarely, 2 1 it has indicated that it will not be governed by these labels.
The Government contended in the instant case that
employment as a merchant seaman was a "privilege," but this court also
refused to concern itself with the dichotomy. Recognizing that due process
is a concept which depends upon circumstances and varies with the necessities of the situation, the court concluded that the lack of procedural protection afforded the individual in the instant case was not necessitated by
the interests of national security.
The precise changes that the instant court's ruling will require the
Coast Guard to make in the administration of the Port Security Program
cannot be ascertained clearly from the opinion. The minimal due process
requirement imposed by the court, that the applicant must be apprised
with reasonable specificity of all the contents of adverse reports furnished
to the Commandant and the appeal boards, has, in light of previous practice in the administration of the overall security program, a manifest significance. To the individual affected by the program, the relief from the
utter frustration of attempting to prove the falsity of an unknown accusation must mark the most desirable single reform in the security program
system. Probably more significant than the result reached by the court,
however, is the manner in which that result was reached; that is, by a balancing of the interest of affording the individual procedural protection
against the interest of promoting and protecting national security. Where
previously the courts had accepted the argument that they were dealing
with "privileges," they avoided this difficult task of balancing.
The critical question to be examined is whether the instant court's
evaluation is a correct one. The Government consistently has argued that
21. See Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), where the issue vis a vis government employment was avoided only by invoking the maxim that constitutional issues
should not be reached if alternative grounds for decision exist. Four Justices considered the maxim inapplicable. The majority construed an ambiguous Executive Order
as denying the Loyalty Board jurisdiction in the case, thereby avoiding the constitutional issue.
22. Thus in Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952), the Court, in holding
that dismissal of a public employee for membership in an organization listed by the
Attorney General as subversive, without regard to the individual's knowledge of the
organization's activities, was "patently arbitrary," found it unnecessary to decide
whether there was an "abstract right" to public employment.
It is arguable that the language of Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46, 58 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951), that "due process of
law is not applicable unless one is being deprived of something to which he has a
right," has been, in effect, overruled. The only remaining question then is whether the
Court will accept the conclusion of the instant court that the use of confidential information is "patently arbitrary." Brown & Fasset, supra note 19, at 1192-93.
23. See Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 246 (1944); Betts v.
Brady, 316 U.S. 455, 462 (1942) ; Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909); cf. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
24. This probably means that applicants must at some stage be shown the investigating agency's report. The court considered the possibility that a "fair r~sum" in the
nature of that found sufficient in the Selective Service situation, supra note 14, might
meet the dictates of its decision. It concluded that it would be up to the Government to
prove that such a rsum is in fact fair, and the court could ". . . not presently see
how that could be done without access . . . to . . . the original report." Instant case
at 723 n.21.
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to reveal even the contents of its dossiers on individuals would often reveal
the sources of that information, and that such revelation would prevent the
Government from tapping these needed sourcesP In answer it has been
pointed out that, except in cases of excessive timidity, the accuser or informant will not, by the possibility that his identity might be revealed, be
dissuaded from giving evidence which he thinks is necessary for national
safety or welfare. Rather, it is the venal, the grudgebearer or even the
psychopath who needs the encouragement of anonymity to bear his false
testimony 28 A more weighty factor justifying non-disclosure is the fact
that a contrary rule might compel the Government to reveal the identity,
not only of private informants, but also of key undercover agents. Recognizing this to be a valid consideration, a court still should not adopt one
rule for all situations. In cases involving relatively non-sensitive positions,
such as the instant case or the Bailey v. Richardson27 situation, the real
harm to the individual may outweigh the speculative harm to national security. Therefore, the Government should be compelled to choose either to
contest security clearance and risk revealing the source of its information
or to allow a possible security risk to be cleared. The latter alternative
would not redound to the nation's detriment: since the individual is known,
surveillance is feasible, and, should the imminence of sabotage become too
great, temporary measures, even confinement, may then be justified. In
other areas the reconciliation of competing interests may not lead to the
conclusion that administrative determinations should not be made on the
basis of confidential information. Where the acts of disloyal individuals
could cause greater or lasting harm to the nation and, consequently, where
the character of the person is very important, it would follow not only that
much less in the way of evidence is needed to justify the exclusion of the
individual, but also that the use of confidential information may be necessary. Even here, however, the court need not bow completely to this administrative determination, but might, for example, require at least an
in canwra revelation of the evidence, in order to determine whether there
is a reasonable basis for the administrator's decision. Where the question
of sensitivity of the area arises, the determination of whether or not to
permit the use of confidential information must depend upon a variety of
circumstances, but even if, in some areas, the most perfect procedural protection cannot be afforded on the administrative level, the individual is assured of at least a greater protection if the court first balances the conflicting interests, rather than abandoning all discretion to the administrators
under the guise of "privilege."
25. See, e.g., Parker v. Lester, 112 F. Supp. 433, 443-44 (N.D. Cal. 1953). It has
been observed that the court there reached its conclusions on the basis of an FBI press
release. Brown & Fasset, supra note 19, at 1199-200.
26. Instant case at 718-21; Brown & Fasset, supra note 19, at 1200-04; see also
Justice Douglas' dissenting opinions in United States v. Nugent, 346 U.S. 1, 13 (1953),
and Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 350 (1955).
27. 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 341 U.S. 918

(1951).
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Constitutional LawPROCEDURE SUBMITTING CONFESSION TO JURY
WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO DISREGARD IF FOUND
COERCED VIOLATES DUE PROCESS
Petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced
to life imprisonment. At the trial the petitioner had objected to the admission into evidence of a confession signed by him on the ground that it was
coerced. It is the established procedure in the State of Washington to refer
the factual question of coercion to the jury unless the state concedes that
the confession was coerced or the uncontroverted facts establish that it
was coerced as a matter of law.'
Accordingly, the confession was received in evidence along with evidence as to the circumstances under
which it was made, and the jury was charged to consider the confession only if it was found to be voluntary. 2 There was substantial evidence aside from the confession upon which the jury could have found
4
3
After exhausting his state remedies without avail,
the defendant guilty.
petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus in a federal district court on the
ground that admission into evidence of a coerced confession deprived him
of due process of law. 5 The district court, after a de novo hearing on this
issue, found that the confession was coerced in fact and granted the writ.6
The court of appeals affirmed, holding that plaintiff was deprived of due
process since it could not be determined whether this confession was or was
not accepted by the jury in arriving at its verdict. Cranorv. Gonzales, 226
F.2d 83 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 24 U.S.L.. WEK 3182 (U.S. Jan.

10, 1956) (No. 531).

7

1. See State v. Meyer, 37 Wash. 2d 759, 226 P.2d 204 (1951) ; State v. Van Brunt,
22 Wash. 2d 103, 154 P.2d 606 (1944) ; State v. Seablom, 103 Wash. 53, 173 Pac. 721
(1918). There are two principal views with respect to the role of the jury in determining the use of a confession as evidence in a state criminal proceeding. Under the socalled "orthodox view," the judge alone resolves the issue of voluntariness. Not more
than twelve states follow this orthodox view. Comment, 52 MICH. L. Rzv. 421, 423-24
(1954). For an extensive collection of American cases, see 3 WiGMOR, EvwENcs
§ 861 (3d ed. 1940, Supp. 1955). The rule which the majority of states, including
Washington, follow is that, where there is a conflict in evidence, the issue of voluntariness must be submitted to the jury with instructions to disregard it if it is found
involuntary. Annot., 85 A.L.R. 870 (1933). For a detailed survey of state confession
procedures, see Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of Responsibility
Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHi. L. Rzv. 317 (1954). There is a similar split in
the federal courts. At least one circuit court has held that the judge alone decides.
Shaffer v. United States, 221 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1955). The Supreme Court has enunciated a discretionary rule in this regard. Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 624
(1896).
2. rhe court in the instant case proceeded upon the assumption that the instructions given to the jury measure up to those found constitutionally acceptable by the
Supreme Court in Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 170-75 (1953). Instant case at
85 n.1.
3. Id. at 85-86.
4. Id. at 94.

5. The statutory basis for such a petition is found in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (a) (1952).
6. Giron v. Cranor, 116 F. Supp. 92 (E.D. Wash. 1953).
7. The question presented on the application for certiorari was: "Did the federal
district court have jurisdiction to decide de novo whether the prisoner's confession was
coerced, even though that issue had been fully tried in state court procedure meeting
all constitutional requirements?" 24 U.S.L. WiXK 3158 (Dec. 6, 1955). Under the U.S.
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Since Brown v. Mississippia it has been well settled that the admission
of a coerced confession into evidence in a state criminal proceeding is a
violation of the fourteenth amendment. Five subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, four by dictum 9 and one in the holding,10 indicated that the conviction should fall if a coerced confession has been used in evidence, even
though there was evidence apart from the confession sufficient to sustain
the jury's verdict. However, in 1953 in Stein v. New York," the Court
modified this rule by affirming a procedure whereby the confession was
given to the jury with instructions to consider it only if found voluntary.
The Court stated that the conviction will stand, despite the fact that the
confession is found on review to be coerced, if there was other substantial
evidence upon which a conviction could be based.
The instant court purported to distinguish the Stein case. The court
reasoned that in Stein the Supreme Court was acting in ".. . a purely ap-

pellate capacity and had neither precedent or means for adding any new
facts to the record before it . . ." whereas the district court, in passing on

the application for the writ of habeas corpus, was able to hold an inde-3
pendent inquiry x2 to determine the voluntariness of the confession at issue.
At the very best, all that such a distinction could establish is that, in Stein,
the Supreme Court was foreclosed from ascertaining whether or not the
confession was voluntary,' 4 while the district court in the instant case had
found expressly that the confession was coerced. But under the Supreme
Court's treatment of Stein, whether or not the confession was coerced was
irrelevant. The Court stated that, regardless of whether the jury admitted
Code, 28 U.S.C. §2241(c)(3) (1952), a district court may grant a writ of habeas

corpus to a prisoner in custody of a state in violation of the Constitution, so long as
the condition of exhaustion of state remedies has been met. Section 2243 requires a
federal judge, on motion of habeas corpus, to " . . summarily hear and determine the
facts. . . " The Supreme Court, in Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), had occasion
to consider what weight a federal district court should give to prior determination by
the state courts of the issues raised in a petition for habeas corpus. The majority
ruled that a repetition of the trial is not required where the state record is clear, and
it appears that the state process has given fair consideration to the issues and offered
evidence, and has resulted in a satisfactory conclusion. But it added that a trial may
be had in the discretion of the federal court or judge hearing the application. This federal review of facts previously considered by the state court is not prohibited by principles of res judicata. Id. at 458. See also United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260 (1954); Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (1950). Though the instant case appears to be the first in which a federal court has reviewed de novo a factual question which was resolved in the state court, such a review was, under Brown
v. Allen, within the court's discretion.
8. 297 U.S. 278 (19Z6). See also Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944);
Ward v. Texas, 316 U.S. 547 (1942); Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940).
9. Stroble v. California, 343 U.S. 181, 190 (1952) (dictum) ; Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63 (1951) (dictum); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (dictum) ; Lyons v. Oklahoma, 322 U.S. 596, 597, n.1 (1944) (dictum). In all these cases,
with the exception of Haley, the Court found the confessions were not in fact coerced.
In Haley the only question decided was whether the confession was coerced, the Court
finding that it was.
10. Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). The Court divided five to four,
with one Justice concurring only in the result.
11. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
12. See note 7 supra.
13. Instant case at 91.
14. Ibid.
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and relied on the confession or rejected it and relied on other competent
evidence, the procedure followed did not violate due process.' 5 In reaching
this decision the Court relied on two factors: first, the confession was submitted to the jury with a caveat that it was to be considered only if found
voluntary; second, there was substantial competent evidence upon which
the conviction might have been based. Nowhere in the opinion is there an
intimation that a different conclusion would have been reached if the Court
had been able to determine conclusively that the confession was coerced.lsa
Since both the factors found controlling by the Court in Stein are present
in the instant case, it represents a clear repudiation of the Stein rule.
Although the court's distinction of Stein cannot be justified, its opinion
represents a more fair and better reasoned adjudication of the problem presented by these cases. The court has pointed out that under the Stein rule
a defendant may be convicted largely on the basis of a coerced confession
and be unable to show that his constitutional rights have been violated. 16
This would not seem an empty fear, for, while there may be a presumption that juries obey instructions," it would seem indeed naive to believe
that all juries are going to isolate and determine the question of coercion.1 8
It is quite conceivable that in a close case, where the jury was not unanimously agreed upon the defendant's guilt, a confession which was in fact
coerced could be used to persuade the doubtful to change their vote. Furthermore, to allow a conviction to stand despite the introduction of a coerced
confession tends to negate one of the underlying rationale for exclusion of
this type of evidence. Not only is its trustworthiness questionable, but the
coercion is a type of police practice which can be discouraged by a judicial
holding that the evidence vitiates the whole trial.' 9 Effective control of such
15. 346 U.S. at 193-94.
15a. There has been some supposition that in Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556
(1954), the Supreme Court implicitly overruled the Stein case. See dissenting opinion
of Justices Minton, Reed and Burton, 347 U.S. at 584. See also 43 CALIF. L. Ray.
114 (1955) ; 53 MIcH. L. REv. 468 (1954). While it is true that in Leyra the Court
reversed the conviction after determining from the trial record that the confession
was involuntary, the case should not be considered as a limitation of Stein. In Leyra,
unlike the instant case and Stein, there was not enough evidence apart from the confession upon which a conviction could have been based, and the trial judge so charged
the jury. People v. Leyra, 304 N.Y. 468, 473, 108 N.E.2d 673, 674 (1952). Moreover,
in Leyra the absence of conflicting testimony as to facts indicating coercion led the
Court to hold as a matter of law that the confession was coerced. 347 U.S. at 561.
See LADD, EVIDENCE 500-07 (2d ed. 1955). The instant case thus appears the first to
repudiate the Stein rule.
16. Instant case at 90.
17. 346 U.S. at 170.
18. See the concurring opinion of Justice Jackson in Krulewitch v. United States,

336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949), in which he said, "The naive assumption that prejudicial
effects can be overcome by instructions to the jury . .. all practising lawyers know
to be an unmitigated fiction." Id. at 453.
19. Due process has been construed as requiring prevention of fundamental unfairness in the use of evidence, regardless of whether it be true or false. Harris v.
South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68 (1949); Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949);
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49 (1949); Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596 (1948) ; Malinski
v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945). See also McCormick, The Scope of Privilegein
the Law of Evidence, 16 TEXAs L. REv. 447, 452-57 (1938). The exclusionary rule has
also been defended on the ground that a coerced confession violates the privilege
against self-incrimination. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34
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invidious practices might be weakened appreciably if the jury is permitted
to use confessions in the above described manner.
The greatest impact of the rule laid down in the instant case will be in
its effect upon the trial procedure of those states which refer the factual issue of the voluntariness of a confession to the jury, to be determined along
with their deliberations on guilt or innocence. Consequently, there is no
way to know whether the jury accepted or rejected the confession in reaching its general verdict. This uncertainty, coupled with a later positive finding of coercion by a federal court in an habeas corpus proceeding, is held by
the instant court to be a denial of due process. Perhaps the difficulty could
be obviated by removal of the uncertainty. One way to do so is a special
verdict on the question of the confession or submission of interrogatories
to the jury. Yet use of these devices has met some resistance on the ground
that they impair the right to trial by jury.20 While they are not repugnant
to the Federal Constitution, 21 their adoption would probably require legislative action or possibly an amendment of some state constitutional provisions guaranteeing trial by jury. 22 An alternative method to obtain a posi-

tive decision on coercion in the original trial is to adopt the rule of the
23
minority of states where the issue is always decided by the judge alone.
In addition to a clear showing of the trial court's disposition of the confession question, it avoids a procedure whereby the same persons consider
that issue at the same time they are weighing guilt or innocence.
The possibility of a federal court's subsequent granting of a writ of
habeas corpus is not precluded by simply removing the uncertainty in the
trial court. Even though it is found at the trial that the confession was
voluntary, the present statute permits a de novo hearing on petition for a
writ of habeas corpus.2 4 A defendant convicted in a trial where his confession was held voluntary and admitted into evidence can still obtain his
release if he can convince the federal judge that it was in fact coerced. However, the existence of a definitive determination of voluntariness may make
the federal court reluctant to conduct a de novo hearing, at least more so
than where the disposition in the trial court is unknown.25 Furthermore,
L. Rzv. 1, 27-30 (1949) ; see 3 WmcOR, EViDsNCE § 822 (3d ed. 1940) where
the exclusionary rule is explained on the ground that such evidence is unreliable and
MINN.

untrustworthy. This is the minority view.

20. The common-law concept of jury trial in criminal cases embraced only a general verdict. People v. Tessmer, 171 Mich. 522, 137 N.W. 214 (1912); Smith v. Ohio,
59 Ohio St. 350 (1898) ; State v. Boggs, 87 W. Va. 738, 106 S.E. 47 (1921). The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure make no provision for anything but a general verdict.
21. The Federal Constitution does not impose a requirement of jury trial on the
states. Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581 (1900); Hallinger v. Davis, 146 U.S. 314
(1892).
22. See cases cited in note 20 supra.
23. See note 1 s.pra.
24. See note 7 supra.
25. See instant case at 90. In 1950 the United States district courts passed on 126
applications for writs of habeas corpus by state prisoners and gave a hearing of some
kind in 44 of them. Of these 44 hearings only eight lasted over one hour and only one
more than three hours. In just one of these 126 applications was the writ granted.
Appendix to opinion of Justice Frankfurter, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 526-29
(1953).
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the possibility of the petitioner succeeding, even if a hearing is granted, is
diminished by the effect which the trial court's decision will have in the
habeas corpus proceeding.

CorporationsDIRECTORS OF HOLDING COMPANY MAY PROPERLY
DEPOSIT CORPORATION'S SOLE SUBSTANTIAL
ASSET IN A VOTING TRUST WITHOUT
SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL
A chain of holding companies controlled a number of operating subsidiaries. Each of the holding companies owned a majority interest in the
company below it, and at the beginning of this chain was an elderly couple
who were the principal stockholders of the first company. In 1954 the
board of directors of one of the intermediate companies established a voting trust into which they transferred their sole substantial asset, the stock
of the next company in the chain. The trust agreement provided that the
life of the trust should be ten years, a term which exceeded the elected
terms of the members of the board of directors,1 most of whom were named
as trustees. In 1955 negotiations were being conducted to effect a merger
of the lowest holding company in the chain with a similar but unrelated
corporation, a merger which would deprive the holding company chain of
control over the resulting corporation. Thereupon the principal shareholder
of the intermediate company, i.e., the next higher company, and the couple
whose power to control had been cut off by the voting trust brought suit
to enjoin the trustees from voting the stock in the trust in favor of the
proposed merger 2 and to have the trust declared void. The Supreme Court
of Delaware, affirming the trial chancellor, 3 held that the power bf directors
to deposit in a voting trust shares of stock of a controlled subsidiary corporation is not restricted by the principle of non-delegation of managerial
duties, notwithstanding the fact that the shares represent the sole substantial asset of the corporations. 4 Adans v. Clearance Corp., 121 A.2d 302
(Del. 1956).
The Delaware corporation statutes clearly authorize a shareholder to
deposit his shares in a voting trust; no differentiation is made between a
1. The directors had been elected only for a normal one-year term. Appendix to
Brief for Appellants, p. All.
2. Though the merger has since been consummated, a motion by defendants to
dismiss the appeal as moot was denied, because the legal issues were still properly before the court. See Adams v. Clearance Corp., 118 A.2d 924 (Del. 1955).
3. Adams v. Clearance Corp., 116 A.2d 893 (Del. Ch. 1955).
4. A collateral issue is presented by plaintiffs' contention that the present trust
was an improper extension of a previous trust, in which the intermediate company's
stock had been deposited. The court disallowed this claim, holding that the second
trust was a new and independent trust as a matter of law, although acknowledging
that the ultimate purpose of each trust was the control of the lowest holding company.
Instant case at 307-08.
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corporate shareholder and an individual shareholder. But the instant case
does not present a problem of whether a corporate entity can legally participate in a transaction cast in the form of a voting agreement. Rather,
the question is whether a disposition of assets with so vital an effect on
the corporate entity, regardless of the form of the particular transaction,
should be made by the board of directors without obtaining prior shareholder
approval.6 The instant court did not deal with this problem directly,
nor is there a definite answer to be drawn from case law.7 However,
there are two well settled doctrines in corporate law which give some
help in an analysis of the soundness of the instant decision. In the first
place, the directors do not have unfettered discretion in dealing with corporate assets.8 Subject to restrictions in the by-laws, charter, or general
law, the directors may exercise any corporate power which may be regarded
as pertaining to the ordinary business of the corporation, without consulting
with or obtaining the consent of the shareholders.9 Although this power
covers a multitude of acts, including the sale, lease, exchange, or mortgage
of some of the corporate assets,10 statutes 11 and judicial decisions 12 usually
deny directors the power to dispose of all, or substantially all, of the corporate assets without securing stockholder approval.13 The underlying
policy of these decisions is to reserve to the shareholders decisions upon
questions of fundamental importance. 14 Secondly, directors' powers are
5. Corporations can exercise all the rights, powers and privileges attendant upon
ownership of stock in any other corporation. Dxr. CODP ANN. tit. 8, § 123 (1953). "One
or more stockholders" may deposit stock in a voting trust. Id. §218(a). A majority
of the states have enacted similar statutes expressly authorizing voting trusts. These
are listed in 5 FLETcHER, PgivATa CORPORATIONS §2080.1, at 370 n.41 (perm. ed.
rev. vol. 1952). See also the useful tabulation in Note, 28 GEo. L.J. 1121, 1123-25

(1940).,

6. "There is . distinction between the powers of the corporation itself and the
powers of the board of directors, and an act may be within the powers of the former
and not of the latter." Ostlind v. Ostlind Valve, Inc., 178 Ore. 161, 191, 165 P.2d 779,
791 (1946).
7. But see text at note 19 and note 19 infra.
8. Statutes generally provide that the business and affairs of a corporation shall
be managed by a board of directors. See, e.g., DEL. CODs ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1953) ;
ILL. ANN. STAT. c. 32, § 157.33 (Smith-Hurd 1954) ;ALI & ABA, MODEL BusINzss
AcT § 33.
9. See, e.g., Cass v. Manchester Iron & Steel Co., 9 Fed. 640 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1881);
Riddle v. Mary A. Riddle Co., 140 N.J. Eq. 315, 54 A2d 607 (Ch. 1947); Duncan v.
Ponton, 102 S.W.2d 517 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937) ; cases cited in 2 FLTCHXR, PRIVATS
CORPORATIONS § 505, at 546 n.66 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1954).
10. See, e.g., Keenan v. Zemaitis, 4 F2d 572 (D. Mass. 1925); Fontaine v. Brown
County Motors Co., 251 Wis. 433, 29 N.W.2d 744 (1947); 2 FL=rcHSR, PRIVATZ CORPoRATIONs §§ 505, 516, 517 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1954).
CORPORATION

11. E.g., Dxi. CODS ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1953) ; N.Y. STocK Cou. LAW § 20; see
compilation of statutes in Note, 37 VA. L. Rxv. 595, 598 n.22 (1951).
12. See, e.g., Northern Mining Co. v. Trunz, 124 F.2d 14 (9th Cir. 1941) ; Macht
v. Merchants Mortgage & Credit Co., 22 Del. Ch. 70, 194 At. 23 (Ch. 1937); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Refining Corp., 14 Del. Ch. 193, 126 Atl. 46 (Ch. 1924); Hanrahan v. Andersen, 108 Mont. 218, 90 P.2d 494 (1939).
13. Exceptions are made if the corporation is in a failing condition or has become
insolvent. E.g., Howard v. Republic Bank & Trust, Co., 76 S.W.2d 187 (Tex. Civ. App.

1934)-.
14. See Commerce Trust Co. v. Chandler, 284 Fed. 737, 739 (1st Cir. 1922);
SEC v. Transamerica Corp., 67 F. Supp. 326 (D. Del. 1946), aff'd and nwdified, 163
F.2d 511 (3d Cir. 1947).
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limited by the doctrine of illegal delegation of managerial duties. The complexities of modern corporate management require that an authority to
delegate managerial duties, to some extent, must be implied, for many
boards of directors cannot possibly attend to all the details and current
business of the corporation, and it is not customary for them to do so. 15 The
law therefore permits some delegation of the management functions of the
directors,16 but, in the absence of express authorization by statute, charter,
or by-law, complete or substantial surrender has not been allowed,' 7 especially if the delegation is for a period of time exceeding the terms of the
directors.' 8 In spite of this, one court has held that a statute authorizing
voting trusts forecloses inquiry into the propriety of delegation by the directors of all their significant duties.' 9
The underlying policy of both of these doctrines seems applicable to
the instant case. The transfer of the stock to the voting trust was a disposition of the entire assets of the corporation in return for voting trust
certificates. Manifestly this was a decision of fundamental importance and
called for shareholder approval. The transaction is also tantamount to a
complete abrogation of managerial duties by the board of directors. Its
principal function in the chain of holding companies was to exercise the
prerogatives of a shareholder of the corporation on the next lower link.
Yet it was precisely to insulate that stock from its corporate shareholder
that the voting trust was created and interposed.2 0 Moreover, the directors' action falls within the area of aggravated illegal delegation inasmuch
as the duration of the voting trust exceeded the elected terms of the direc2
tors. 1

15. See Ford v. Magee, 160 F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1947); Social Security Board v.
Warren, 142 F2d 974 (8th Cir. 1944).
16. E.g., Lydia E. Pinkham Medicine Co. v. Gove, 298 Mass. 53, 9 N.E.2d 573
(1937) ; San Antonio Joint Stock Land Bank v. Taylor, 129 Tex. 335, 105 S.W.2d 650
(1937). See BALLANTINZ, CoRPORATIoNS § 46 (1946) ; 2 FI.=cHtR, PRIVATS CORPORArINs § 495 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1954) ; STZviNs, PRiVAva CORPORATIONS § 144 (1949).
17. E.g., Kennerson v. Burbank Amusement Co., 120 Cal. App. 2d 157, 260 P2d
823 (1953); Marvin v. Solventol Chemical Products, Inc., 298 Mich. 296, 298 N.W.
782 (1941).
18. E.g., Sherman & Ellis, Inc. v. Indiana Mut. as. Co., 41 F.2d 588 (7th Cir.
1930); Long Park, Inc. v. Trenton-New Brunswick Theatres Co., 297 N.Y. 174, 77
N.E.2d 633 (1948).
19. Day v. Hecla Mining Co., 126 Wash. 50, 217 Pac. 1 (1923). Another court,
however, has expressed the belief that such a statute may be inapplicable to voting
trusts involving holding companies, for otherwise directors would be divested of any
voice in the affairs of the corporation they were elected to manage. Knickerbocker Inv.
Co. v. Coorhees, 100 App. Div. 414, 419, 91 N.Y. Supp. 816, 819 (1st Dep't 1905) (dictum), criticized in Finkelstein, Voting Trust Agreements, 24 MIcH. L. REv. 344, 364-65
(1926). The instant court distinguished Knickerbocker on the theory that the facts
of that case indicated a fraudulent scheme by the directors to obtain control of the
corporation and that the case is therefore an example of equity striking down an
abuse of directorial power, not a lack of such power. Instant case at 306-307.
20. Defendants alleged that the purpose of the voting trust was to improve the
marketability of a proposed stock issue, but it does not appear what further steps were
taken with respect to such an issue. Instant case at 304.
21. See text at note 1 and note 1 supra.
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In not following the course indicated by both of these settled doctrines,
the instant court based its holding on the ground that the application of a
rule which would restrict the power of the board of directors if the assets
deposited were great enough, would be too uncertain. The feasibility of
such a rule, however, has been demonstrated in cases dealing with the sale
or disposition of corporate assets.22 These decisions were not referred to
in the opinion. Though there are many cogent business reasons which
23
might increase the advisability of entrance into a voting trust agreement,
the need for such action would never seem so urgent that a decision affecting substantially all corporate assets could not await stockholder approval
at an annual or special meeting.2 4 Perhaps, as the court suggests, the best
solution to the problem presented by the instant case would lie in a limitation of the scope of directorial powers by the legislature.25 It would seem,
however, that even in the absence of such a statutory provision the instant
court's acquiescense in the directors' assumption of the power to deposit
the corporation's sole substantial asset in a voting trust is neither demanded
nor warranted by the existing statutes or case law.

EvidenceMONITORED UNLICENSED RADIO BROADCAST
ADMITTED IN PROSECUTION OF CRIME UNRELATED
TO FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Defendant 1 was indicted for violating the immigration laws by concealing on his farm illegal entrants into the United States. On several occasions defendant broadcast, over a two-way radio transmitter, instructions
22. See text at notes 10 and 12 and notes 10 and 12 supra.
23. Voting trusts have been validated for such legitimate business projects as reorganization, Warner Bros. Pictures v. Lawton-Byrne-Bruner Ins. Agency Co., 79
F.2d 804 (8th Cir. 1935) ; obtaining a loan or protecting creditors, Thompson-Starrett
Co. v. E. B. Ellis Granite Co., 86 Vt. 282, 84 Atl. 1017 (1912); attracting investors,
Mackin v. Nicollet Hotel, Inc., 25 F.2d 783 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 618
(1928) ; or protecting minority stockholders and those with equal holdings who wish
to prevent voting deadlocks, Day v. Hecla Mining Co., 126 Wash. 50, 217 Pac. 1
(1923). For discussion of validity of purpose, see BALLANTIMa, CoR'oRATIoNs § 184a
(1946) ; 5 FLgrEcR, PmivATz CORpORATIONS § 2081 (perm. ed. repl. vol. 1952) ; LFAvsvr, THn VOTING TRusT 79-103 (1941). See also Annot, 105 A.L.R. 123 (1936).
24. Unless the conditions referred to in note 13 supra existed.
25. Some statutes are more stringent as to directorial powers and require stockholder assent before directors can sell, lease, mortgage, exchange, or otherwise dispose
of corporate assets. See, e.g., MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 15-901 (1947).
1. Although there were two defendants in the instant case, treatment of the issues
discussed herein will be facilitated by considering the defendants in the singular, since
only one of the defendants ever applied for a radio operator's permit, but the other
also operated the station.
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to his field overseers for secreting the illegal entrants. Defendant's radio
transmitter was licensed by the Federal Communications Commission 2 but
he did not receive his operator's permit until a month after these broadcasts
commenced. At the request of the Immigration Service, an FCC agent
monitored the broadcasts during a period beginning before and continuing
after the issuance of defendant's permit. Before trial, defendant moved to
suppress the evidence obtained by the monitoring, and to dismiss the indictment, on the ground that admission of such evidence would violate section
605 of the Federal Communications Act, which prohibits interception and
divulgence of wire or radio communications by any person not authorized
by the sender.3 The district court granted the motions. On appeal, the
Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that defendant's unlicensed broadcasts are
not protected by section 605, although the broadcasts intercepted after defendant received his operator's permit may not be disclosed. United States
v. Sugden, 226 F.2d 281 (9th Cir. 1955), cert. granted, 350 U.S. 952
(1956).

The purpose of section 605 is said to be to protect the "means" of communication. 4 Although wiretapping by federal agents has been held not
to violate the fourth amendment, and therefore evidence so secured is not
subject to the federal exclusionary rule,5 the Supreme Court has interpreted section 605 to forbid the use of such evidence in federal courts.6 The
Court's rationale for thus interpreting section 605 is the plain meaning of
the statutory terms "no person" and "divulge," the Court holding the former to include federal officers and the latter to include introduction in evidence. 7 The occasion for this interpretation involved only wire communication, but the "plain meaning" theory on which the interpretation rests
necessarily comprises within its scope all communications to which section
605 is applicable. The logic of the Court's decisions in the telephone cases
would thus seem to compel the exclusion of evidence secured by federal
agents through interception of private radio communications, since section
8
605 applies expressly to these as well as to wire communications.
Despite the all-inclusive nature of the Court's interpretation of section
605 in the telephone cases, when the only prior federal case involving radio
2. Defendants station was apparently licensed as an "industrial" station under

47 C.F.R. § 11 (1953).
3. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1952), provides:

"...

no person not

being authorized by the sender shall intercept any [wire or radio] communication and
divulge or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
such intercepted communication to any person...."
4. E.g., Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129, 133 (1942).
5. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
6. Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) ; Nardone v. United States, 302

U.S. 379 (1937).

7. See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937).
8. Radio broadcasts for the use of the general public or relating to ships in distress are specifically excluded by proviso. 48 STAT. 1103 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 605
(1952).
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monitoring by FCC agents arose, the Ninth Circuit in Casey v. United
States 9 upheld the admissibility of such evidence in a prosecution under
the Communications Act for illegal broadcasting. On its facts, the Casey
decision appears well founded in the policy of the statute. The Communications Act gives the FCC power to "inspect" radio installations to determine whether they are operating in conformance with FCC rules and regulations, the provisions of any applicable statute, and license conditions.' 0
An indication of legislative consent to FCC monitoring for enforcement of
the act may be found in the fact that the FCC has described such monitoring activities at length in its annual reports to the Congress," which has
made appropriations for these purposes since 1927.a 2 The court in the
instant case recognized the necessity of such monitoring to enforce the act,
and made an exception by way of dictum for admission of monitored evi13
dence in proceedings under the Communications Act.
Where the issue is the admissibility of monitored radio broadcasts in
prosecutions for crimes unrelated to the Communications Act, a realistic
solution consistent with the Court's broad holdings in the telephone cases
is not so easily found. Although relevant legislative history is sparse, 14
ample grounds appear at the policy level for distinguishing radio from wire
communications under section 605. A telephone company owns its wires
and grants individuals a contractual right to the use of those wires, but a
radio licensee owns only his sending apparatus and has no vested interest
in any frequency or in the use of the ether.' s At the same time, radio com9. 191 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1951), rev'd per curiam on other grounds, 343 U.S. 808
(1952).
10. 48 STrA. 1083 (1934), 47 U.S.C. § 303(n) (1952). Licenses are required for

individual radio operators as well as for radio stations, 48 STAT. 1081, 1089 (1934), 47
U.S.C. §§ 301, 318 (1952), and FCC rules prescribe detailed qualifications for opera-

tors. See 47 C.F.R. § 13 (1953). The permit obtained by defendant, a "restricted radiotelephone operator" permit, is the only one for which neither written nor oral examination is required. 47 C.F.R. § 13.22(g) (Supp. 1955). Licensees are subject to comprehensive regulations, violation of which may be cause for license suspension, 48 STAT.
1082 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303(m) (1952), or revocation, 48 STAT. 1086
(1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 312 (1952), denial of license renewal, e.g., Matter of
Knickerbocker Broadcasting Co., FCC Dkt. No. 5771 (1939), 10 Am L. REv. 372
(1939), or criminal prosecution, 48 STAT. 1100 (1934), 47 U.S.C. §§ 501-02 (1952).
Among the causes specified in the act for license suspension are the transmission of
superfluous, profane or obscene communications, or false call letters. 48 STAT. 1082
(1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. § 303(m) (1) (D) (1), .(2) (1952). Broadcasting obscene language is also a separate statutory crime. 18 U.S.C. § 1464 (1952).
11. E.g., 20 FCC ANN. Rn,. 115-22 (1954).
12. Reply Brief for Appellants p. 5.
13. Instant case at 285. An interpretation of § 605 which would prevent FCC
agents from enforcing the act by the most practicable method available would be
incongruous. Cf. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937).
14. There is, however, some indication that the practically identical provision in
the Act of Feb. 23, 1927, c. 169, § 27, 44 STAT. 1172, which the Communications Act
was said to replace without substantive change, 78 CONG. Rc. 10313 (1934), had been
considered inapplicable to federal officers. See Hearings Before the House Committee
on Expenditures in the Executive Departnents on Wire Tapping in Law Enforcement,
71st Cong., 3d Sess. 24 (1931) ; Note, 6 Gao. WAsH. L. REv. 326, 328-31 (1938).
15. See Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC, 326 U.S. 327, 331 (1945) ; FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940) ; 68 CONG. REc. 4112 (1927).
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munications are inherently less private than telephone communications ;.any
other operator attuned to the same frequency can receive a radio message,
if his receiver or the transmitter is of sufficient strength,16 but only another
party to the same line can normally overhear a telephone conversation.

Thus, the telephone user can ordinarily speak freely in reliance on the privacy of his medium, while a radio operator has no reasonable expectation
of privacy. These considerations suggest that, in the careful balancing of
interests between the prosecution of crime and the privacy of the individual, a different conclusion is justified as to interception of radio messages,

licensed or unlicensed, than as to interception of telephone messages. This
seems particularly so in the case of unlicensed broadcasts, where there appears no legitimate interest to protect, since the means of communication
is illegal per se.
However, the court in the instant case was not free to pursue such a
policy analysis, at least so far as licensed broadcasts are concerned. The

breadth of the Supreme Court's holdings in the telephone cases and the
language of the statute left the court no alternative except to exclude the
evidence obtained by interception of the licensed broadcasts. At the same
time, the "means of communication" rubric 17 provided a convenient basis
for holding section 605 inapplicable to licensed broadcasts.' 8 The court's
total position, admitting monitored evidence where the purpose is enforcement of the Communications Act and where, in prosecutions for unrelated
crimes, the broadcaster was illegally on the air, leaves room for several vexing problems to arise in future proceedings under section 605. For example, if FCC agents overhear evidence of crime while lawfully monitoring a
licensed station for the purpose of insuring that no false call letters are
being sent, would the agents be permitted to so testify in a prosecution for
the substantive crime? Cases upholding admission of evidence secured by
federal agents while acting lawfully, where the evidence would be inadmissible in other circumstances, 19 indicate that such testimony should be
permitted. If so, no realistic limitation on divulgence of licensed broadcasts
would remain, because of the difficulty in establishing that the FCC moni16. In the instant case, any receiver within a seventy mile radius of defendant's
transmitter could, if tuned to the same frequency, overhear defendant's messages. See
Transcript of Record, p. 44. Within this radius are included the following towns with
indicated populations: Arizomn-Yunia (1,908), Somerton (1,825), Gadsden (350),
Wellton (150), Dome (113), Growler (200), Fortuna (75), San Luis (38), Mohawk
S22), Dateland (50), Aztec (50), Palomas (10), Tacna (7); Californa-El Centro
12,590), Calipatria (1,428), Calexico (6,433), Brawley (11,922), Imperial (1,759),
Ripley (300), Blythe (4,089), Picacho (5), Laguna (150), Winterhaven (700),
Niland (700), Westmorland (1,213), Holtville (2,472), Seeley (600) and the Yuma
Indian Reservation; Mexico-Mexicali (64,701) and also Pascualitos and Bataques.
RAND McN.rY & Co., PPzmn WoRLD ALA4s (1952).
17. See text at note 4 supra.

18. The court defined means of communication as ':..licensed stations manned by
licensed operators." Instant case at 284 n.3.
19. See United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Harris v. United
States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947) ; Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927) ; Benetti
v. United States, 97 F2d 263 (9th Cir. 1938).
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toring was not for the purpose of enforcing the act. But if such testimony
were prohibited, as the court seems to suggest, 20 the anomalous effect would
be the suppression of evidence lawfully acquired, with the only gain the
protection of a privacy which is at the outset only theoretical. Similarly,
if a station is licensed and its licensed operator broadcasts on an unassigned
frequency, is the station or the operator "illegally on the air" as to broadcasts on that frequency? While the court in the instant case followed the
only sensible path open to it, within the restricted framework of the statute
and the Supreme Court's previous decisions, it is apparent that a satisfactory resolution of the problems presented by the interception of radio communications must await congressional action. 21

Food, Drug, Cosmetic LawRESTITUTION NOT AUTHORIZED IN AN INJUNCTION
PROCEEDING UNDER FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG AND
COSMETIC ACT
Defendants, in violation of the Food and Drug Act,' initiated a fraudulent scheme for selling a "sex rejuvenator" through the mails. Although
federal officials discovered the plan almost immediately, thousands of payments had been received by defendants before they were enjoined from
further operation. The United States, in addition to praying for general
injunctive relief, requested that the defendants be ordered to refund to the
purchasers all the money received. Although the only remedies expressly
provided by the act are criminal prosecution,2 seizure of goods 3 and restraint of future violations, 4 the United States contended that restitutions
was included within the injunctive power conferred by the act upon the district courts. The court held that, since there was no indication of congressional intent to permit other than the limited remedies authorized by
20. Instant case at 285.
21. Cf. The prophetic remarks of Senator Pittman on § 27 of the bill which
became the Radio Act of 1927: ". . . The language in its uncertainty is dangerous....
[When we are constructing a law of this importance... why should we not give
some thought to it?" 68 CONG. R c. 4109, 4112 (1927).

1. 52 STAT. 1040 (1938), 21 U.S.C. §§331-92 (1952).
2. 52 STAT. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 333 (1952).
3. 52 STAT.1044 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 334(a) (1952).
4. 52 STAT.1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1952).
5. "Restitution" is used in the present context to mean a method of enforcing a
regulatory statute by reimbursing purchasers of an article sold in violation of that

statute. This is different from the normal meaning of the term as a civil remedy to

compensate an injured party for his loss. See 5 CoasiN, CONTRACTS § 1102 (1951).
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the act, it had no power to order restitution. 6 United States v. Parkinson,
135 F. Supp. 208 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
A lower federal court is a legislative creation with a limited jurisdiction; it is capable of exercising only those powers granted to it by Congress.7 In the Food and Drug Act Congress conferred upon the district
courts ". . . jurisdiction ... to restrain violations . .. " 8 The plain mean-

ing of "to restrain" and its less obvious definitions connote only present
activities designed to influence future events. 9 Seemingly the term cannot
be interpreted to authorize general equitable relief or power to restore a
past condition. 10 Legislative history reveals no indication that Congress
intended to authorize a restitutionary remedy." In analogous situations
where restitution has been decreed without express statutory provision,
with one exception, the congressional grant of equitable power in the par2
ticular statute involved was much broader than that in the instant case.'
The exception is the Fair Labor Standard Act, which contains the same
wording as the Food and Drug Act; 13 nevertheless it has been interpreted
by some lower federal courts to permit a refund to injured persons in an
injunction proceeding. 14 However, use'of this analogy ds precedent in the
6. For a more detailed report of the facts in the instant case, see Goodrich, Restitution--Modern Application of an Ancient Remedy, 9 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 564,
567-69 (1954).
7. Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850); United States v. Rice, 176 F.2d
373 (2d Cir. 1949); see Warren, History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37
HARV. L. Rxv. 49, 65-111 (1923).
8. 52 STAT. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 332(a) (1952).
9. BLACK, LAW DIcTi NARY 1477 (4th ed. 1951); 2 WnssTgr,
N-w INT9RNATiONAL DicrIoNARY 2125 (2d ed. 1934).
10. However, "to restrain" may be considered synonymous with "to prevent,"
Smith v. Warrior, 99 Ala. 481, 12 So. 418 (1893), 77 C.J.S., Restrain (1952), which
in another statutory reference has been held to confer general equity jurisdiction upon
district courts. Section 4 of the Sherman Antitrust Act authorizes district courts to
"prevent and restrain violations." 26 STAT. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. .§ 4
(1952). There are cases in which affirmative relief other than injunctions.has been
afforded 'under this section. E.g., Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. United States, 334
U.S. 110 (1948) (divestiture); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Co., 321 U.S. 707
(1944) (extensive inspections); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1910)
(dissolution). However, the language in the Sherman Act appears broader and the
remedies that have been fashioned under it have been designed to prevent future violations by removing the means through which competition could later be decreased. Restitution of spoils gained in one violation of the Food and Drug Act may deter future
violations, but does not create conditions which will make such violations more difficult.
-11. See DUNN, FDMRAL Foon, DRUG AND CosMETIc Acr-A STATIMCNT O9 ITS
LGISLATIM RecoRD (1938).
12. E.g., the provision in the Emergency Price Control Act: "...
an order enjoining such acts or practices, or for an order enforcing compliance with stch provision, and upon a showing ... such person has engaged or is about to engage in any
such acts or practices a permanent or temporary injunction, restraining order, or other
order shall be granted . . . ." 56 STAT. 33 (1942), 50 U.S.C. § 925 (a) (App. 1946)
(Emphasis added.). For discussion of analogies to other statutes, see Noland, Section
302(a) of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act: Restitution Re-Examined, 7

FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 373-90 (1952).

13. "The District Courts . . . shall have jurisdiction . . . to restrain violations.
s2 STA. 1069 (1938), 29 US.C. § 217 (1952).
14. McComb v. Frank Scerbo & Sons, Inc., 177 F.2d 137 (2d Cir. 1949); Walling
v. O'Grady, 146 F.2d 422 (2d Cir. 1944). For a criticism of these decisions, see Noland,
.rpranote 12, at 380-83. There is contra dictum in Walling v. Crane, 64 F. Supp. 88,
90 (D. Ga. 1945).
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instant case is tenuous. First, one court found the power to order restitution, not in the provision conferring injunctive power, but in the section
of the Wage Act conferring upon individual employees the right to recover back wages.' s The Food and Drug Act has no similar provision.
Second, after the United States Supreme Court expressly reserved ruling
on the issue, 6 Congress in 1949 amended the Fair Labor Standard Act
to preclude the Government from requesting restitution as an adjunct to
an injunction.' 7 Past administrative action offers even less help than legislative history or analogy in the attempt to find restitution implied in the
power to enjoin. Despite the fact thatthe Food and Drug Administration
had been operating under the same wording of the statute for twelve years,
it did not assert a right to restitution until 1950.18 Thus, although the
instant case is the first judicial disposition of the availability of restitution
under the Food and Drug Act, the result appears to be correct.
The facts of the present case demonstrate that restitution may be a
desirable remedy under the Food and Drug Act.' 9 Obviously the defendants' intent was not to operate a continuing legitimate business, but rather
was to make a quick profit on a comparatively small investment. The defendants were receiving an average of five hundred orders a day, ranging
from ten to thirty-five dollars an order. Their basic ingredient cost defendants only an average of twenty-five cents per order.20 Even adding
advertising and mailing expenses, it is probable that defendants realized a
sizeable profit though detected within several days after their operations
commenced. Considering the fact that not all violations are detected as
quickly, similar schemes may even be more profitable. None of the existing
remedies under the Food and Drug Act are designed to make the violators
disgorge such profits. The criminal fines, which the statute authorizes, do
15. Walling v. Miller, 138 F.2d 629 (8th Cir. 1943). The applicable section is 52
STAT. 1069 (1938), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1952)..
16. McComb v. Jacksonville Paper Co., 336 U.S. 187, 193 (1949).
17. 63 STAT. 919 (1949), 29 U.S.C. §217 (1952).
18. A refund to purchasers was requested for the first time in 1950, in an amendment to the complaint in Mytinger & Casselberry v. Ewing, 2 CCH FOOD DRUG
Cosm. L. REP. 17203 (S.D. Cal. 1951). Levine, Restitution--A New Enforcement
Sanction, 6 FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 503 (1951). That litigation was eventually settled
by a consent decree which, although not granting restitution, carefully avoided preclusion of use of this sanction in the future. See Lev, The Nutrilite Consent Decree, 7
FooD DRUG CosM. L.J. 56, 66 (1952). However, the novelty of the Government's request evoked much discussion in the legal periodicals. See Goodrich, supra note 6;
Rhyne, Penalty Through Publicity: FDA's Restitution Gambit, 7 FooD DRUG CosM.
L.J. 666 (1952) ; Noland, supra note 12; Lev, supra; Levine, supra; Note, Developinents in the Law--Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARv. L. REv. 632, 720
(1954) ; Note, 4 SrAN. L. REv. 519 (1952).
19. There has been considerable debate as to whether restitution is a permissible
remedy under the existing Food and Drug Act. For arguments that restitution is, see
Goodrich, supra note 6; Levine, supra note 18; Note, 4 STAN. L. REv. 519 (1952). For
arguments contra, see Noland, supra note 12, Rhyne, supra note 18; Note, Developments in the Law-Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 67 HARv. L. Rv. 632, 718
(1954).
20. These additional facts, not reported in !fie instant case, are related in Goodrich, supra note 6, at 567-69.
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not serve as a sufficient deterrent. 21 The most effective way to stop this
type of fraudulent business is to remove the profit motive; this result can
best be accomplished by the remedy of restitution. Besides serving as an
additional sanction to enforce compliance with the act, restitution may be
desirable in order to make the defrauded purchasers whole. The purchasers
22
may have valid common-law claims against the violators either for fraud
or for breach of warranty,2 but it is unlikely that they will sue. The small
amounts involved do not justify the expense of litigation and the difficulty
of obtaining jurisdiction over defendants 24 as well as the embarrassment
attendant to trial militate against bringing suit. Restitution as requested
by the Government, on the other hand, would facilitate recovery by the
public.
Restitution under the Food and Drug Act, however, presents several
practical and procedural problems which should be taken into account.
First, it is arguable that such a refund procedure might work harsh results
upon innocent violators who had no intent to defraud.2 In order to obviate
this possibility, restitution should be confined to those cases where the evidence introduced to obtain the injunction clearly shows a deliberate intent
to defraud. A second major difficulty that can be settled by legislation concerns the amount of money that should be refunded. An argument has
been made that since the primary purpose of restitution when it is used as
a sanction to enforce an act is to restore the status quo of the defendants
rather than that of the claimants, the reimbursement should be based on
the illegal profits and not the purchaser's actual loss. 2 6 This contention
rests on the fear that any other valuation than illegal profits may unduly
penalize the violators. However, there is no reason why restitution in this
21. The maximum monetary penalty for first offenses is $1,000 while that for
second offenses and those violations committed with a fraudulent intent is $10,000. 52
STAT. 1043 (1938), 21 U.S.C. § 333(a), (b) (1952). However, the courts have generally been reluctant to assess heavy money penalties, McKay & Frauwirth, The Penalty Provisions of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 6 FooD DRUG Cosm. L.J.
575, 590 (1951), and therefore the criminal provision generally has not proven an effective deterrent. Note, 4 STAz. L. REv. 519-20 (1952).
22. See Wennerholm v. Stanford University School of Medicine, 20 Cal. 2d 713,
128 P2d 522 (1942).
23. Cf. Miller v. Economy Hog and Cattle Powder Co., 228 Iowa 626, 293
N.W. 4 (1940).
24. Where multi-state operations have been conducted, a plaintiff may have difficulty obtaining personal jurisdiction over the defendants. jurisdiction over persons is
usually based upon presence. GooDRicH, CoNrricr or LAWS § 73(1) (3d ed. 1949).
There is an exception if the person has had sufficient contacts with the state to make
it reasonable that he be sued there. Wein v. Crockett, 113 Utah 301, 195 P.2d 222
(1948). Only in the case of insurance solicitation by a corporate body has the sending
of mail into a state been held sufficient for jurisdictional purposes. Travelers Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950) ; see Note, JurisdictionOver Foreign Corporations: An Analysis of Due Process, 104 U. PA. L. R.v. 381, 389 (1955); 104 U. PA.
L. REV. 561 (1956). Although the misrepresentation may constitute a tort in the
state where plaintiff read the promotional material and acted in reliance thereon, this
is probably insufficient basis for personal jurisdiction. Cf. McClelland v. Colt's Patent
Fire Arms Mfg. Co., 10 N.J. Misc. 156, 158 Ati. 329 (Sup. Ct. 1932).
25. See Note, 4 STAN. L. Rxv. 519, 534-35 (1952).
26. Id. at 529-34.
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situation should not also serve to penalize as well as to deter, especially if
its application is limited to instances of deliberate fraud. By accepting
what apparently is the Government's view that the full purchase price
should be returned, the problems involved in determining either the defendant's profits or the actual overpayment by each purchaser would be avoided
while still guaranteeing the principal objective of deterrence. Lastly, it
might be argued that restitution to the purchasers will not be feasible in
some situations since many violators have no records with which to identify
those to whom they sold. But the most dangerous schemes are those which
utilize the mails in order to make numerous contacts quickly over a wide
area before they are enjoined by the Government. Such plans, by necessity,
must include retention of a list of names and addresses for the purpose of
filling orders. Even in those situations where it is impossible to trace all
the purchasers, Congress could provide that the Government shall confiscate the ill gotten spoils as the representative of the public.27 The foregoing
analysis suggests that Congress should amend the act to provide broader
remedies than the instant court found to be authorized at present.
27. Cf. 104 U. PA. L. Rsv. 121 (1955).

